Content distributed by broadcast and multicast services is often encrypted (scrambled) to protect copyrighted material. When any cryptanalysis of the current cryptographic scheme used in such services is found, the scheme must be updated. However, the scheme cannot be updated suddenly because a lot of subscribers have receivers with the current scheme.
Introduction
Copyrighted content distributed by multicast services like broadcast and cable TV is often encrypted. It is called 'scramble' in the broadcasting services through the air. The subscribers who want to obtain the services have to use receivers that have a decryption or descrambling module for the scheme used. (In the following, we use the words 'encryption and decryption' instead of 'scrambling and descrambling') If a cryptanalysis is developed 1)- 6) , the scheme and the decryption modules should be updated. The method of update is an especially important issue for pay-TV service providers.
Pay-TV service providers do not want to use any vulnerable encryption scheme and they want to use a new and secure encryption scheme as soon as possible. However, there are a lot of receivers that cannot recover content encrypted with a new encryption scheme.
If their decryption modules were able to easily and quickly be updated, there would be no problem. For example, when a decryption module is implemented in software and the receiver has a network connection such as the Internet, it can easily be updated through the networks. In addition, TLS enables secure updating.
On the other hand, when a decryption module is a hardware one, the update is not easy. Only when the decryption module has a rewritable memory, such as a flash memory, and when its decryption algorithm is installed in the memory, the update of the algorithm is possible. However, even if the module has a rewritable memory, the large size of memory is necessary. When the algorithm is updated, the module cannot erase a current algorithm until it makes sure that the new algorithm works correctly. More concretely, at the beginning of the algorithm update, the module installs a new algorithm while it continues to hold the current algorithm in the memory. It then checks the procedure of the new algorithm. If the new algorithm works correctly, the module erases the current algorithm and completes the update of the algorithm. If the new algorithm does not work correctly, the module erases the new algorithm and continues to use the current algorithm. In both cases, during this update process, the module has to hold two algorithms in the rewritable memory, and approximately twice the size of memory is required.
There are a lot of cases that the module does not have enough memory. In addition, there are a lot of decryption modules that do not have any rewritable memory. Naturally, such modules cannot update the algorithm in real-time or quickly. In such cases, the receiver, which has the decryption module, must be sent to its man-ufacturer, the module is replaced, and the receiver is sent back to its owner. It needs a lot of cost and time. It may result in the suspend of the services. The subscribers like neither such cost and time nor abeyance of the services.
The decryption module used in Japanese TV services, for example, is an LSI circuit in the TV set (receiver). It should be noted that the module is used also by pay-TV services. Replacing the decryption modules in Japan's more than 126 million TV sets 7) would be a troublesome job and would take a long time.
Even if the job is not easy and a long time period is necessary, all decryption modules must be updated to protect copyrighted content.
1 Related Works
As far as we know, except for our previous works 8) 9) , there have been no paper with regard to practical updating method of cryptographic schemes for broadcasting services that has backward compatibility.
However, there are works 10)-24) related to scrambling update methods. That is, only some parts of compressed content are encrypted in our methods and the related works addressed such partial encryption. Thus, it is possible to use these related works for the same purpose (cryptographic scheme's updating).
It is called selective encryption technique and the main target of the works is to reduce the computational costs for encryption or decryption of content. That is, when encryption or decryption is performed with CPU in PCs or some portable devices, the CPU ability is sometimes small and the cost of encryption or decryption should be small. For the purposes, such selective encryption techniques are proposed.
The selective encryption technique is the one to encrypt only a part of content. Spanos and Maples proposed the first selective encryption technique for MPEG-1 video 10) . Following this, a lot of selective encryption techniques have been proposed. Li et al. focused on the picture layer of MPEG video encoding and proposed a technique that encrypts only I-pictures 11) . Shi and Bhargava's technique encrypts motion vectors of B-and P-pictures 12) . The AC-coefficients of low frequencies are encrypted in Kunlemann and Reinema' technique 13) and those of high frequencies are encrypted in Cheng and Li's technique 14) . Shi and Bhargava reduced the computational cost by encrypting only sign bits of all DCT coefficient 15) . Tang modified the order of coefficient scanning to make the technique more secure 16) . However, Uehara and Safavi-Naini 25) , and Qiao and Nahrstedt 17) developed efficient attacks on Tang's technique. Qiao and Nahrstedt uses one time pad instead of symmetric encryption schemes 18)19) . Tosun and Feng proposed a technique that makes multiple layers in encoded content and encrypts only certain layers. Yu proposed a similar technique that has scalability 20) . Lookabaugh et al. reviewed these proposals and proposed a combination method of encryption and compression 26) .
Currently, encryption or decryption of broadcasting services are performed in an LSI chip-set and it is almost meaningless to encrypt a part of content for reducing its computational cost. However, such selective encryption techniques are useful for updating cryptographic schemes. The concept was described in 26), but no concrete construction is described.
A method that uses multiple encryption schemes is described in the patent of Candelore, Unger and Derovanessian 27) . However, only its method is described and its security analysis is not described. The method encrypts only headers of Packetized Elementary Streams (PES) in MPEG compressed stream and the other parts of the compressed stream are not encrypted. Candelore, Unger and Derovanessian insisted that all receivers cannot reconstruct original content when they cannot find PES headers. The insistence is not correct and there are a lot of receivers that start decoding from the other headers. From this point, there are some security holes in this method.
We then proposed two concrete constructions 8)9) . As far as we know, it is the first paper whose main target is to update encryption and decryption schemes in practical ways that have backward compatibility and that shows its concrete constructions with their security analysis.
2 Our Contributions
Our goal is to develop a practically secure updating method of cryptographic schemes for broadcasting services especially through the air and to minimize the increase in the transmission bit rate imposed by this method. In the previous version of this work 8)9) , we proposed two concrete methods: basic and trade-off methods. They have trade-off relationship between security and transmission bit rate. In addition, we proved that these methods are secure since any pirate receiver (PR) cannot reconstruct content in real-time.
In the proof, we set the condition that a PR reconstructs the same content as its original one. However, the PR is not legal nor authorized one and users allow the content decoded with the PR to have some differences from the original content. This means that the security analysis of previous work is insufficient. As long as this is a security system, sufficient security analysis is essential. Without such analysis, people cannot rely on the system. We then have to take the other strong attacks into account.
In this paper, we show another strong attack by PRs. The content reconstructed by the attack is different from the original one in some parts. We then prove that our methods are practically secure against such an attack.
As a result, we confirm that our cryptographic methods that use both the current and new cryptographic schemes would be secure, efficient and useful before the new scheme completely replaces the current one.
3 Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the structure of MPEG encoded video content, transport stream coding, and video decoding that are used in our proposal. Section 3 revisits our proposed methods: basic and trade-off methods, and their transmission bit rates. We discuss on their security from the viewpoint of service qualities in Sect. 4. Particularly, we show a new attack, a method to construct another type of PR, and prove that the methods are also secure against such a new attack. This security analysis is our main contribution of this paper and it was not presented in the previous works. We discuss the delay imposed by the methods in Sect 5. Finally, we conclude in Sect. 6.
Preliminaries:MPEG Structure
Let us review the structure of MPEG encoded video content, transport stream coding, and video decoding 28)29) . MPEG compression and transmission codings are most widely used for broadcasting services through the air and the number of receivers based on the MPEG standards is enormous. We, thus, focus on the scrambling scheme update of the MPEG system. In the following sections, we explain only essential parts of MPEG codings that are relevant to our proposal. 29) Current Japanese broadcasting services through the air encode video, audio and data content, and transmit it to receivers. Encoded video content is larger than either encoded audio or data content and its bit rate needed for transmitting video content is higher than that for transmitting audio or data content. Thus, the most effective way to reduce the total transmission bit rate is to reduce the bit rate needed for transmitting video content without degrading its quality.
1 Encoding of Video Content
In MPEG2 video encoding, the content is processed in several layers: for example, block, macroblock, slice, picture, group of pictures (GOP) and sequence layers. In the block layer, each block consists of sixty-four (64 = 8 × 8) pixels and these pixels are transformed with two-dimensional discrete cosine transform (DCT) into sixty-four coefficients. These sixty-four DCT coefficients are quantized. This quantization means that the redundancy of the video content is removed and the block data is compressed. These quantized coefficients are encoded with Huffman coding scheme, a variable-length entropy coding scheme that works as another compression scheme. A macroblock consists of four (4 = 2 × 2) luminance blocks and two chrominance blocks. A slice consists of consecutive macroblocks, and the number of macroblocks in a slice is not fixed. A picture is a set of slices and is the same as the frame. In almost all cases, a GOP consists of fifteen pictures. A sequence consists of a number of GOPs.
All slices, pictures, GOPs, and sequences in the encoded bit stream have a header. Each header has a distinct start-code, a slice-start-code (SSC), a picture-start-code (PSC), a group-start-code (GSC) and a sequence-header-code (SHC). All headers and encoded DCT coefficients are combined and become a bit stream. This bit stream is called an elementary stream (ES). Figure 1 shows the encoded video structure.
Each start-code can be expressed as 00001xx in hexadecimal notation. It is a 32-bit code with twenty-three consecutive 0 bits, one 1 bit and xx of eight bits. The xx of each start-code is distinct from that of any other start-code. Moreover, there is no other code in MPEG2video that has twenty-three consecutive 0 bits.
Receivers start decoding after finding a start-code. It should be noted that there is no fixed start-code for a macroblock nor a block, and it is not easy to know the start position of a macroblock nor a block without decoding sequentially from a certain start-code.
2 Structure of the Group of Pictures
(GOP) 29) In almost all cases, a GOP consists of fifteen pictures, including one I-picture, four P-pictures, and ten Bpictures. These picture types differ in their coding (encoding and decoding) schemes. The coding scheme for I-pictures is called intra-frame coding. That is, the tar- get frame is encoded without using the data from other frames. The coding schemes for P-and B-pictures, on the other hand, are called inter-frame coding and the target frame is encoded using data from other frames. The data of the I-and P-pictures is used to encode Bpictures and other P-pictures. Concretely, P-picture is encoded with using its previous I-or P-picture data and B-picture is encoded with using not only its previous Ior P-picture data but also its next I-or P-picture data. Naturally, only encoded I-picture data is needed to recover the I-picture. Recovery of a P-picture requires its previous I-or P-picture data and that of B-picture requires not only its previous I-or P-picture data but also its next I-or P-picture data. Figure 2 shows GOP structure and relationships between a picture and the other pictures used for the encoding and decoding.
3 Transmission of Encoded Content 28)
Encoded video content is so large that it has to be divided into small and plural packets, such as IP or TS packets, according to its purposes or transmission channels and these packets are then transmitted to receivers. Before this division, a header is added to each ES, and the ES is shaped to suit the IP or TS packet format. We will not explain this shaping here because it is irrelevant to our proposal.
As an example, suppose that an hour's worth of 500 kbps video data is encoded to at least 225 Mbytes. The maximum size of an IP packet is limited to 64 kbytes and a packet of 1,500 bytes is generally used. The TS packet is 188 bytes. Encoded video content can therefore not be distributed without being divided into multiple packets.
An ES is first divided into several PES. Each PES is then divided into 184-byte segments, each of which becomes a TS packet when a 4-byte header is added to it.
A TS packet includes not only parts of PES data but also some other control data. We show the structure of a TS packet in Table 1 . There is two-bits transport scrambling control bits (what it follows SCB) among the descriptions that we use in our proposal. Table 2 shows the assignment of these two-bits in the standard. In addition, we show the relationships among an ES and TS packets used in current digital broadcasting services in Fig. 3 .
4 Decoding of Encoded Content
An ES is transmitted after being divided into small packets. Receivers examine and remove the packet headers of the IP or TS packets before they recover the ES.
The receivers then search the ES for a start-code, such as SSC, PSC, GSC or SHC. When they find one, they start reconstructing content. These start-codes trigger decoding, meaning that the receivers cannot start decoding until they find one. As far as we know, there is no receiver that can reconstruct content perfectly without first finding a start-code.
Although it may be possible to reconstruct content without finding a start-code, doing so would be very difficult. One reason for this is that the coding method is variable-length. That is, the receiver has to guess the start position of a certain code and start decoding. If the receiver started decoding at an incorrect position that was as little as one bit away from the correct position, it could not obtain correct content and might find an unknown code somewhere. Finding an unknown code means that the guessed start position was not correct and the receiver has to guess the start position again.
The entropy coding method is efficient with regard to the compression rate. There are a lot of similar bit streams among codes, so it is difficult to guess the correct start position of a code.
Revisit Previous Methods 8)9)
We revisit the methods in this section. There are two scrambling scheme update methods: basic and trade-off methods. In both the methods, MPEG2 video coding 28)29) is used as an example content coding method.
The basic and trade-off methods are constructed under the same design concept and have following characteristics.
1. Almost all parts of encoded content are not en-crypted. 2. Only a main and small part of encoded content is encrypted. 3. Two encryption schemes, current and new schemes, are used simultaneously for an identical part. 4. The method has practical security from the viewpoint of service quality. 5. The method has backward compatibility.
The encoded content is encrypted using a symmetric encryption scheme and transmitted to receivers.
During the scheme update period before all decryption modules will be replaced, there would be two types of receiver, those with a current decryption module and those with a new one (sometimes those with both ones). As a result, two types of encrypted content are necessary and service providers would thus have to distribute two types of encrypted content for one plaintext content to provide identical service to both receivers (the third and fifth characteristics).
However, this is not desirable because it would require twice the transmission bit rate. Thus, in the methods, only a small part of the content is encrypted and almost all parts are not (the first and the second characteristics). That is, the increase of their transmission bit rates is extremely small.
In addition, the encrypted part is a main part (the second characteristic). More precisely, the part is absolutely imperative and if the part is missing, any part of the content is not recovered. That is, if this part is encrypted, the part cannot be decrypted without decryption key and not only the part but also the whole content is protected. The small encrypted part plays the same role as the encrypted version of all the encoded content. In the methods, the encrypted part includes not only the header but also its consecutive compressed content data. It is more secure against data guessing attacks since it is more difficult to guess the encrypted compressed content data than guessing the headers.
Totally, only special parts of the encoded content are encrypted using both the current and new cryptographic schemes and the other parts are not. The unencrypted parts and the two types of encrypted part are multiplexed and transmitted to all receivers. This enables every receiver recovering the plaintext content through its decryption module regardless of the type of that module. This property is absolutely necessary to keep providing fair services to all subscribers (the fifth characteristic).
When a receiver obtain the services, it has to choose the parts that can be decrypted by itself. For this purpose, three flags are used. Each of them indicates the part encrypted using the current cryptographic scheme, the part encrypted using the new cryptographic scheme, or the unencrypted part. Scramble control bits of transport stream (TS) were introduced as the flags 8) . The control bits have been used until now for the other purpose, and the proposed method uses the bits pattern reserved for future use. It seems that all current receivers do not execute any procedure when they receive the bit pattern, but we cannot say that they do not execute anything. Some current receivers may execute somethings. As an another method, a new descriptor was introduced 9) . The new descriptor is ignored by the current receivers since operations according to the descriptor is not defined in them. The new descriptor can spin off the irregular operation of current receivers.
Encoded part encrypted using two symmetric encryption schemes is about twice the size of the corresponding plaintext encoded part. We therefore encrypt as little of the encoded part as possible. In particular, we maximize the size of the unencrypted parts from which a decoder cannot recover any plaintext content. Minimizing the size of the encrypted parts keeps the increase in the transmitted part to a minimum.
These methods can be used during the period when a cryptanalysis against the current scheme has been developed and the cryptanalysis needs high computational cost 1)-6)30) . Intuitively, they can be used during the period when the current cryptographic scheme is practically secure. Here, practical security means that any adversary cannot, or can with only very small probability, make a PR that can recover content with an acceptable level of quality, such as service quality (the fourth characteristic). A PR that recovers content without ensuring that it has service quality would not be an acceptable alternative for subscribers.
Cryptological security means that, for example, there is not more efficient cryptanalysis than brute-force search against a symmetric encryption scheme. However, even if cryptanalysis against such cryptological security is developed, the cryptanalysis does not threaten the practical use of a scheme so long that it has high computational complexity. There is a gap between cryptological and practical security. This is because, for example, all actual receivers (including PR) have fairly limited (not unlimited) CPU power and is not seemed to have more effective attack method than the known practical attacks. Practical security, which we take into account in this paper, means that • The PR's CPU is less powerful than that of the most powerful existing computer. • It is hard or impossible for the PR to get services in real-time with service quality (the fourth characteristic).
That is, even if there is more efficient cryptanalysis than brute-force search and even if PR uses the most powerful existing computer, the cryptanalysis takes a lot of hours or dates. The cryptanalysis does not affect the service soon and critically. In fact, although cryptanalysis against AES and SHA-1 was developed 2)3)30) , AES and SHA-1 are used now. This is because its computational complexity is high and the cryptanalysis cannot critically impact the system right now.
Broadcasting receivers are manufactured according to standards, and in almost all cases, they are hardware. The security modules in the receivers are also hardware. Moreover, their manufacturers would not have considered or developed any updating method since they cannot add nor implement any new security technology to such legacy receivers. As far as we know, there has not been any research regarding to practical updating methods that maintain backwards compatibility and thus, this paper is the first practical proposal in the world.
The proposed methods allow both legacy and new receivers to get the same services. We prove that they are practically secure from the viewpoint of service quality while assuming that a PR has CPUs, decryption modules and decoders at the current level of technology. That is, although there is a guessing attack that can guess the original data of the encrypted parts more efficiently than cryptanalysis, but the probability of guessing the original data is so small that it is too difficult to obtain consecutive content in real-time from only the unencrypted parts. This means that in our scheme, content obtained with a PR will not be of service quality, and hence, any copyright on that content can be preserved.
Finally, we show that the methods are efficient in terms of the transmission bit rate from observation of the current system. We measured some transmission bit rates of the current broadcasting system and calculated the necessary increase of the rates from the measured rates. The results show that the size increase is practically small.
As a result, we confirm that our cryptographic meth-ods that use both the current and new cryptographic schemes would be useful before the new scheme completely replaces the current one. Two cryptographic schemes are used simultaneously before the insecure one is replaced. This means that there will be two different decryption modules in use during that period.
Content providers need to encrypt their content with two encryption schemes in order to provide the same level of service to all subscribers until they all get the new receivers.
Actual decoders cannot reconstruct plaintext content without finding a start-code (see Sect. 2. 4). The methods take advantage of this. That is, they encrypt only the packets that contain start-codes and the other packets are transmitted without being encrypted. In addition, not only the start-codes but also their consecutive compressed content data in an identical TS packet are encrypted. If an encrypted packet cannot be decrypted, it becomes rather hard to reconstruct the content since the situation is the same as that in which the decoder cannot find a start-code.
In the methods, flags that are used to specify encryption scheme used are determined, and their transmission method was proposed. The method does not disturb any procedure of legacy receivers.
We explain our methods below.
1 Basic Method
The all packets including a start-code are encrypted in this method.
( 1 ) Scrambling and Transmission Two types of encrypted packet are generated for some packets and the other packets are not encrypted. The encrypted and unencrypted packets are multiplexed and transmitted.
The protocol of the method is as follows.
i. Content is encoded with an existing method such as MPEG or H.264/AVC, and a stream such as an elementary stream (ES) is generated. ii. Start-code positions are extracted from the stream. iii. When the stream is packetized, one of the two processes is selected in accordance with the data in the packet.
a. When a start-code is contained, the part of the stream is encrypted and packetized. Both the current and new encryption schemes are used for this process.
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iv. All packets are multiplexed.
There are two major properties of this protocol. One is that the transmission bit rate has to be high only when a packet includes a start-code. The other is that there are three types of packet: two types of encrypted packet and unencrypted packets. Hence, at least three encryption type identifiers (flags) are needed to specify the type of packet. However, these packets have the same identifier (PID) since the packets are for the same program. The structure of the transport stream (TS) generated with this protocol is shown in Fig. 4 .
( 2 ) Receiving and De-Scrambling Receivers extract unencrypted packets and the type of encrypted packet appropriate for their decryption module. They then reconstruct the content. The reconstruction protocol is as follows:
i. The transport stream is divided into TS packets. ii. When the packets are transformed into an ES, each TS packet is treated as follows in accordance with the flag in the packet.
Flag 0:
The receiver removes the packet header and extracts part of an ES.
Flag 1:
The receiver that has a decryption module for cryptographic scheme 1 removes the packet header, decrypts the data, and obtains part of an ES. The receiver that has a decryption module for cryptographic scheme 2 does not use this packet.
Flag 2:
The receiver that has a decryption module for cryptographic scheme 2 removes the packet header, decrypts the data and obtains part of an ES. The receiver that has a decryption module for cryptographic scheme 1 does not use this packet. iii. The receiver combines all the ES parts into a complete ES.
iv. The receiver decodes the ES and reconstructs the content.
The above protocol enables receivers that have either the current or new decryption module to reconstruct the content.
2 Trade-off Method
Trade-off method is based on the basic method. It is a little less secure than the basic method, but is more efficient in terms of transmission bit rate. We thus show that there is a trade-off characteristic between security and transmission bit rate.
Although the basic method is efficient, we can reduce the transmission rate increase more at the expense of security. The decrease in security is not so much, and the method is still practically secure. With regard to transmission bit rates and their security, we discuss in Sects. 4 and 3. 4 and we show only the construction of the method.
There are I-, P-and B-pictures in the encoded video content delivered by the current broadcasting system (see Sect. 2. 2). I-pictures are encoded with an intraframe coding scheme, and P-and B-pictures are encoded with inter-frame coding schemes. P-and Bpictures cannot be reconstructed without reconstructing I-pictures.
We can use this property to reduce the transmission bit rate further. More specifically, we modify the protocol shown in Sect. 3. 1 as follows:
i. Content is encoded with an existing method such as MPEG or H.264/AVC, and a stream such as an elementary stream (ES) is generated. ii. Start-code positions are extracted from the stream. iii. When the stream is packetized, one of two processes is selected in accordance with the data included in the packet. a'. If the start-code is a SSC and is in an I-picture, the part of the stream is encrypted and packetized. Both the current and new encryption schemes are used for this process.
b'. Otherwise, the part of the stream is packetized without being encrypted.
The difference from the protocol in Sect. 3. 1 is the third item. In this modified protocol, the only packets encrypted are those containing the SSC of an Ipicture. Because more of the transmitted packets are unencrypted, it is easier to guess the original data in the encrypted packets than that in the basic method. This means that the protocol is less secure than what was initially presented in Sect. 3. Although many unencrypted packets are transmitted, it is difficult for a receiver without a decryption module nor a decryption key to reconstruct an I-picture, without which P-and B-pictures cannot be reconstructed and the whole content cannot be recovered.
3 Transmission of
Encryption Type Identifier There are three types of TS packets in both basic and trade-off methods: two types of encrypted packets and unencrypted (plaintext) packet. When these packets are transmitted, an encryption type identifier flag : flag ∈ {0, 1, 2} is added for all receivers to treat the packet correctly. We would like to show the two ways in which each flag is transmitted.
One important requirement for these flags is that no unintended behavior occurs in legacy receivers. That is, the legacy receivers understand and use the TS packets that contain flag = 0 (unencrypted) and flag = 1 (current encryption scheme is used), and ignore the TS packets that contain flag = 2 (new encryption scheme is used).
( 1 ) Using SCB We then use the SCB of a TS packet (See Sect. 2. 3) for the transmission of the flag.
The legacy receivers run certain procedures when they receive TS packets whose SCB is 00, 10, or 11. On the other hand, if their SCB is 01, the legacy receivers ignore the packets. We then assign 01 to a flag=2 that indicates that a new encryption scheme is used. New receivers that has a new decryption module are designed to get the packets with SCB=00 and 01 and they can decrypt the packets with SCB=01.
The flags' assignment to SCBs is shown in Table 3 . It should be noted that this new assignment does not affect any procedure of the legacy receivers.
( 2 ) New Descriptor Before using SCBs as flags, broadcasters and manufacturers have to make sure that all legacy receivers ignore the packet with SCB=01. We wonder if it is impossible, and then, propose another assured method.
When packets unencrypted or encrypted with a cur- rent encryption scheme are transmitted, a conventional packet identifier pid is assigned to the packets. When the packets are encrypted with a new encryption scheme, a new packet identifier pid-x is assigned to the packets. Figure 5 shows its assignments. It is necessary to assign SCB corresponding with its encryption scheme.
The next, a new descriptor Simultaneous Scrambling Descriptor is placed in the area 2 of the corresponding program map table, PMT. The descriptor holds a new identifier ES-pid, which is a TS packet identifier pid-x, and a new flag flag = 2, which indicates a new encryption scheme is used. Table 4 shows the structure of the simultaneous scrambling descriptor.
The simultaneous scrambling descriptor is an unknown descriptor for the legacy receivers. The legacy receivers ignores the descriptor and picks up only a conventional pid in the area 2 of PMT. On the other hand, new receivers can analyze the new descriptor. They pick a flag, which indicates an encryption scheme, a pid-x, corresponding identifier, and pid. They use only unencrypted packets among the packets with the pid.
It is possible to add the third and fourth encryption schemes by using this new descriptor. That is, it is possible to place new descriptors pid-y for the third encryption scheme and pid-z for the fourth scheme in the area 2 of PMT.
4 Transmission Bit Rate
A TS packet that has start-codes is encrypted using two encryption schemes. The transmission of two encrypted packets obviously requires twice the transmission bit rate required for the part. However, the increase of the total transmission bit rate is not so much.
( 1 ) Basic Method In current Japanese HDTV broadcasting services, a maximum transmission bit rate of 66 kbps is theoretically necessary for transmitting start-codes SHC, GSC, PSC and SSC (see Fig. 1 ). These codes are standardized in 29). However, the bit rate measured when an ES's transmission bit rate is 19 Mbps averages 20 kbps. There is thus a 46-kbps difference between the maximum (theoretical) and the actual bit rates. The main reason for this difference is that a frame is not divided into the maximum number of slices but is instead usually divided into about 20 slices.
The maximum number of slices in a frame is 68, and the transmission bit rate in the proposed method is the highest when these slices are transmitted in 68 distinct packets.
The amount by which the proposed method increases the transmission bit rate is calculated as follows: It thus increases by 4.7%(0.9 Mbps/19 Mbps).
( 2 ) Trade-off Method Two I-pictures are transmitted per a second, so the amount by which this method increases the maximum transmission bit rate is 240, 544 bits/sec =
T S/f lame × 2 f lames/sec
×188 bytes/T S × 8 bits/byte . Hence, the total transmission bit rate is 19.2 Mbps, which is an increase of 240 kbps. This increase is only 2%.
It seems very practical and is acceptable.
Practical Security
In our previous works, we set the condition that a PR reconstructs the same content as its original one and consider that only such PR is useful. However, the PR is not legal nor authorized one and users allow the content decoded with the PR to have some differences from the original content. We then have to take the other strong attacks into account. The content reconstructed by the PR is different from the original one in some parts. We then prove that our methods are practically secure against such an attack in a multicast content distribution service.
Here, service quality is the most important factor for service providers. In other words, providers want to ensure that any content reconstructed by a PR will not be of service quality.
The use of two cryptographic schemes before the insecure one is replaced means that there will be two different decryption modules in use during that period. Naturally, such methods are not cryptologically secure since the current scheme is insecure. However, here we want to prove that the use of both the current and new schemes is practically secure when cryptanalysis against the current scheme has high computational complexity. There is as yet no definition of practical security for multicast content distribution services and it might be difficult to be defined. Thus, we should first discuss the issues of practical security and show that the proposed methods are much more secure than what service providers actually need.
1 Meanings of Practical Security
Since we assume that there would be cryptanalysis of the current cryptographic scheme, it is impossible to require cryptological security, such that the probability to break the method is negligible. We then use the following observation on the security of the methods:
[Proposition 1] Let Π be the above cryptographic scheme update method of multicast content distribution services. Let PR be a pirate receiver that has existing CPUs, existing decryption modules, and existing decoders, but does not have the decryption key of any cryptographic schemes used in the method. Then, the probability that PR can recover a frame of distributed content, in which some parts are encrypted using Π, in real-time is at most 1/2 13 . This proposition focuses on only the frame some parts of which are encrypted, and not on P-and B-pictures of the trade-off method. We describe the way to calculate this probability in the following section (Sect. 4. 2). Here, we address the meaning of this proposition.
The proposition indicates that the method is practically secure when a PR, that has existing modules, cannot generate content that is of service quality. That is, no decryption module or decoder in a PR has a CPU with unlimited power, and the PR does not have a decryption key. Accordingly, it means that the probability with which the PR can reconstruct a frame in real-time is practically small.
We then address the probability 1/2 13 from the point of view of service quality referring these data.
In current broadcasting systems, a group of pictures (GOP) in a transmitted stream (see Sect. 2) consists of about 15 frames, and it occupies about 0.5 sec. The results of a subjective evaluation indicated that this time interval is the duration in which subscribers can wait without any unsatisfactory feeling when they change TV channels. In addition, block distortion in a frame degrades the quality of the service, even if the distorted area is small relative to the whole image.
The probability 1/2 13 means that only 1 frame of 2 13 frames (= about four minutes' worth of content) can be reconstructed; such a service would not be any value. Four minutes is quite longer than 0.5 sec, and the subscribers should not have to wait so long. Such a PR is not available.
Let us consider the problem now from another viewpoint; the macroblock is the minimum unit for encoding and decoding, and macroblocks are processed one at a time. There are 8,160 macroblocks in a frame of HDTV broadcasting services, so one macroblock occupies 1/8,160 (≈ 1/2 13 ) of a frame. The probability 1/2 13 means that the area in a frame that can be correctly reconstructed in real-time is one macroblock, which is a very small fraction of the frame size. In addition, the position of the reconstructed macroblock in a frame may differ frame by frame. Even if a macroblock at the same position is reconstructed consecutively, the area is very small. Subsequently, if only one macroblock in every frame is decoded correctly and the other macroblocks are not, the content distribution service does not have the desired service quality. This means that the PR is useless.
Moreover, it is worth noting that real-time processing is important for multicast content distribution services. Particularly with regard to popular content, most users want to obtain services in a timely manner. This means that real-time service is critically important.
In other words, if the probability that PR can re- cover a frame in real-time is less than 1/2 13 , we can say the method is practically secure from the viewpoint of service quality.
2 Analysis on Practical Security of Basic Method
We address the security of the basic method and Ipicture of the trade-off method, and prove that the probability that PR can recover a frame in real-time is less than 1/2 13 and that it prevents PR from reconstructing content with adequate service quality in real-time.
Let us assume that there is a cryptanalysis of the current scheme, so that cryptological security is impossible. Let us also assume that both the current and new schemes can be practically used. That is, no adversary has unlimited computational power to obtain any information about the plaintext content from the encrypted content in a practically limited time. Thus, a PR cannot obtain plaintext data from encrypted data in real-time. In addition, it is hard for the PR to recover a content without first finding a start-code (see Sect. 2. 4). Hence, when start-codes are encrypted, it is hard for the PR to reconstruct content in real-time.
Even if the position of start-codes and the header were correctly guessed, guessing their consecutive compressed content data would be more difficult than guessing the start-codes. That is, a PR may of course be able to guess the plaintext data corresponding to the encrypted data, but it is difficult to guess the data correctly. The size of an encrypted TS packet is 188 bytes, and 184 bytes of data are contained in a packet. The TS packet is so large that random guessing would not be successful. Moreover, if the PR has only a few CPUs, it would be almost impossible to guess the data in real-time. That is, the PR would have to guess the start position of a certain code to start decoding. If the guessed position were incorrect, the PR would have to make another guess (see Sect. 2. 4) . Hence, it is hard to reconstruct the plaintext data in real-time, since the PR would not have many CPUs.
The above discussion is based on the condition that the PR has to reconstruct the same content as its original one. When allowing the PR to reconstruct content with some differences from the original one, we have to consider another type of attacks. This PR cannot reconstruct the correct content, but it can reconstruct similar but degraded content. Such a PR does not need to guess all the data correctly and it needs to guess some data that can be connected with the data in the next packet without any error. That is, only several numbers m, d, c, n and a piece of data F C (see Fig. 6 ) need to be guessed correctly. The probability of guessing the values and code of {m, d, c, n, F C} is higher than that of guessing the plaintext data, but it is practically small. The packet consists of m full macroblocks, d full DCT blocks, c codes for DCT coefficients and part of the code for DCT coefficient F C. A full macroblock is the data needed to construct the data of a complete macroblock. A full DCT block is the data needed to construct the data of a complete DCT block. It should be noted that a full macroblock cannot be constructed from d DCT blocks. That is, d is the number of full DCT blocks remaining in the TS packet after all of the full macroblocks are removed. Similarly, c is the number of codes for the DCT coefficients remaining in this TS packet after all of the full macroblocks and full DCT blocks have been removed, and it is impossible to construct a DCT block data from c codes. F C is a code that is divided into two parts: n bits that are placed in this TS packet, and the other bits that are placed in the next TS packet.
If a PR could guess the data set {m, d, c, n, F C} correctly, the PR could recover video content that might not be the same as the original content by using both the data set and TS packets that contain plaintext data. That is, while it may not correctly recover the part of the content whose data is contained in the encrypted TS packets, it may be able to recover other parts correctly. Here, let us suppose that it recovers the left half of an HDTV picture incorrectly, but the right half correctly (i.e., the right half corresponds to the original picture). In some sense, this PR is not useless since the encrypted part occupies only half of a frame. The PR does not need to guess or reconstruct all data correctly. It is easier for adversaries to produce such simple receivers than to produce a perfect receiver that can reconstruct all data correctly.
Considering the above simple receiver, we shall prove the practical security of our method under the following assumption.
[Assumption 1] The maximum number of existing CPUs that a pirate receiver PR can use is less than 10,000,000.
A supercomputer with the fastest computational ability has those of several hundred thousand CPUs. Hence, it would be impractical for a PR to have more CPU power than the supercomputer even if the PR could harness the power of idle CPUs throughout the Internet. In addition, the period during which the proposed methods will be used is not so long, and a 100-fold progress in CPU power will not happen during that period 32) . Hence, the above assumption is reasonable.
Next, we prove the practical security of our method under Assumption 1 by proving the following lemma. proof. Let us calculate the success probability of guessing the numbers m, d, c, n and the final code F C correctly.
Due to the standards of MPEG2, 0 < = m < = 61, 0 < = d < = 5, 0 < = c < = 63 and 1 < = n < = 24, and there are 63 × 4, 096 possible F C codes. There are thus 147, 446, 562, 816 = 62×6×64×24×(63×4, 096) possible combinations. Hence, if there were at least 147 billion CPUs, it would be possible to check all combinations for {m, d, c, n, F C} simultaneously, and a correct combination naturally exists. This means that a PR could find a correct {m, d, c, n, F C} set and that it could obtain some kind of multicast content distribution service in real-time.
Under Assumption 1, however, a PR cannot have 147 billion CPUs. Therefore, even if a PR can use 10,000,000 CPUs, the probability Pr PR of guessing the numbers m, d, c, n and the final code F C correctly is Pr PR = 10, 000, 000/147, 446, 562, 816
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Finally, we show that the basic method is practically secure and that the probability to reconstruct certain I-picture of the trade-off method is practically small. We do this by proving the following lemma.
[Lemma 2] Assuming that the advantage Pr PR of a pirate receiver PR guessing the above numbers m, d, c, n and the final code F C correctly in real-time is less than 1/2 13 . The method is practically secure.
proof. Let Pr adv be the advantage that PR can recover a frame of distributed content in real-time. We will calculate Pr adv by using Pr PR .
Pr PR is the probability that PR correctly guesses some of the data in one TS packet. A frame is divided into several slices, and the data in these slices are divided into TS packets. That is, for one frame there is more than one SSC and thus more than one encrypted TS packet. Let s be the number of slices in a frame. For HDTV broadcasting services, 1 < = s < = 68. Therefore, Pr adv is the same as the probability that s sets of {m, d, c, n, F C} are correctly guessed. Hence, Pr adv is as follows:
This completes the proof of Lemma 2.
Note that, if a PR has less than 10,000,000 CPUs, the probability is much smaller than 1/2 13 . The assumption that the adversary can use 10,000,000 CPUs is advantageous for the adversary, and the actual advantage of Pr adv seems to be much smaller than 1/2 13 . This confirms that our method is practically secure.
3 Analysis on Practical Security of
Trade-off Method Since P-and B-pictures cannot be reconstructed before the corresponding I-picture is reconstructed and the I-picture cannot be practically reconstructed when this method is used, P-and B-pictures that are the same as their original pictures cannot be reconstructed.
Hence, the probability that the adversary can reconstruct P-or B-picture is the same as that of I-picture. However, since the encoded data of the P-and Bpictures are not encrypted, if an adversary generates a dummy I-picture, certain P-and B-pictures could possibly be reconstructed. Naturally, they would not be the same as the original P-and B-pictures and would be similar to the dummy I-picture. This means that an adversary could know relationships between the Ipictures and the P-and B-pictures. Such knowledge is critical to the method's cryptological security but not to its practical security. That is, the content reconstructed by the adversary would not be at all the same as the distributed content. Therefore, this method is also practically secure.
4 Comparison on Security
We compare three methods, a method using a related work, a basic method, and a trade-off method. The method using a related work is a simple one that just encrypts the start-codes only (related method what it follows). There are 256 start-codes in the standard (xx = {00, 01, · · · , ff}). Hence, the probability that the adversary guesses its code correctly is 1/2 8 . It should be noted that once an start-code is guessed correctly, the following start-code can be guessed correctly. Hence, the probability that the adversary can reconstruct a frame is 1/2 8 when the related method is used. On the other hand, the probability that the adversary can reconstruct a I-picture is less than 1/2 13 when the basic method or the trade-off method is used. In this sense, the basic and trade-off methods are more secure than the related method. Moreover, from discussion in Sect. 4. 1, the related method is not practically secure.
When comparing a basic method with a trade-off one, the former encrypts all data in TS packets that contain start-codes. That is, the data of P-and B-pictures is also encrypted. Considering the structure of GOP, the probability that the adversary reconstruct a GOP correctly is less than(1/2 13 ) 15 . On the other hand, in the trade-off method, the data of P-and B-pictures is not encrypted, and hence, the probability that the adversary reconstruct a GOP correctly is less than 1/2 13 . The adversary can use the same attack method against those two methods. Consequently, the basic method is more secure than the trade-off method. The trade-off method is practically secure but is less secure than the basic method.
Other Discussion
We finally address the delay caused by the method that we have to take into account when the method is implemented.
In the current distribution method without update mechanism, all parts of content are encrypted. In the proposed methods, only several parts are encrypted and the other parts are not encrypted. Subsequently, both the time needed for encryption in broadcasters and that for decryption in receivers are reduced.
In the proposed method, more than one TS packets must be added. That is, more TS packets than current method have to be multiplexed. However, the number increased by this method is not so much and the number of multiplexed TS packets always changes currently. This means that the delay in the broadcasters caused by the multiplex of this method and the delay in the receivers caused by the demultiplex are negligible.
Conclusion
We revisited our proposed methods and found their security analysis is insufficient. We did not take the imperfect PR into accounts. We then evaluated our methods against such imperfect PRs. As a result, we showed that the methods is secure against a strong attack and is practical.
Even if cryptanalysis makes schemes less secure, there are many cases in which non-secure schemes are still practical.
In multicast content distribution services such as broadcasting services, content providers use cryptographic schemes to protect copyrighted material. In the above case, the cryptographic scheme of a service has to be updated. Especially, pay-TV service providers want to update it as soon as possible. However, that cannot be done immediately because some receivers cannot update their decryption modules and have to be replaced. Thus, it would be preferable that the update only go into effect after a certain period (at least five years for broadcasting services) during which the current cryptographic scheme can still be used. We proposed two methods that use both the current and new cryptographic schemes simultaneously during that period. That is, any receiver that has either the current or new decryption module can recover the original content.
We showed two methods that are practically secure from the viewpoint of service quality. One is more se-cure than the other one but needs more transmission bit rate than the other one. That is, we showed there is a trade-off between security and transmission bit rate. Both our methods are efficient with regard to the transmission bit rate in that only small parts of the content are encrypted; large parts are transmitted without being encrypted. They require only a 2−15% increase in the transmission bit rate. Both methods can be used practically, and it is important that the broadcaster should choose the method according to their requirements.
As long as the current cryptographic scheme is used, our methods do not have strong security. We discussed their practical security from the viewpoint of service quality and showed that pirate decoders without unlimited power cannot reconstruct any content frame in real-time without a decryption module or a decryption key. In the real world, no machine has unlimited power, so the above practical security is fully reasonable in the actual services. We proved that our methods meet the requirement sufficiently and is practically secure.
The methods can be used during periods when both the current and new cryptographic schemes are used. The methods are practically secure and their transmission bit rates are practical. This makes the methods useful when updating a cryptographic scheme. 
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